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In recent years, the use of social media has become more prevalent across the 
United States. Social media, through the use of personalization algorithms, allows for 
exposure to extremist content and is able to create intimate groups, where like-
minded individuals can communicate with each other. This study considers that, 
though some traditional theorists posit that learning only occurs in face to face 
contexts, the elements of learning described in social learning theory may also be 
present online. Using a set of logistic regressions to test the association between 
exposure to social media and personalization algorithms and violent extremism, I find 
(1) exposure to social media and to personalization algorithms is positively correlated 
with violent extremism and (2) the relationships between exposure to social media 
and personalization algorithms and violent extremism are explained by age, foreign 
  
fighter status and the year of extremist behavior. I discuss the implications of these 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Sutherland (1947) identifies differential association as the process through 
which individuals learn to engage in crime. The main proposition of the theory posits 
that delinquency occurs when an individual has an increased exposure to definitions 
in favor of violating the law compared to those unfavorable of violating the law. 
These definitions develop from interactions between an individual and their close 
family and peers. Akers (1990) expands this idea of differential association in social 
learning theory (SLT) and posits that there are certain mechanisms of the learning 
process that influence the development of these associations.  More specifically, these 
mechanisms include the presence of definitions, differential reinforcement and 
imitation that allow for differential association and subsequent learning to occur. Both 
Akers’ (1990) SLT and Sutherland’s (1947) theory of differential association have 
been well tested and supported throughout criminological research (Pratt et al., 2010; 
Cullen, Agnew, & Wilcox, 2014) . 
However, this long research tradition has only begun to evolve with the 
development of social media. Within the last 10 to 15 years, social media platforms 
have drastically transformed the way that individuals interact with each other and 
with media content. It is entirely probable that the way an individual is exposed to 
both prosocial and antisocial definitions has changed since the advent of social media.  
In the United States, social media usage has become increasingly popular and 
widespread among adults (Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). Duggan (2015) 





70% use the network daily. From 2011 to 2015, there was a significant increase in the 
proportion of U.S. adults using major social media platforms (Duggan, 2015). With 
the expansive reach of social media, it is extremely important to understand how it is 
used and the role it plays in the process of learning different narratives. Social media 
not only creates a virtual space to engage with friends and family—it provides a 
forum for organizations to disseminate information efficiently and cost-effectively. 
However, social media usage is not limited to legal or legitimate organizations like 
businesses, rather extremist organizations have turned to social media as a forum for 
intergroup communication and, more importantly, to attract new members (Europarat, 
2007; Hoffman, 2017).  
In addition to group self-promotion, social media has enabled the 
dissemination of politically extremist narratives in support of violence (Weimann, 
2016) to both those with and without prior exposure to this content. While not all 
exposure comes from groups, some organizations have used social media to target 
vulnerable individuals online. Because messages can be masked in the form of videos 
of reasonable interest, such as a newly released pop song, individuals may be 
unaware of the propaganda they are being exposed to (Europarat, 2007).  This initial 
introduction to extremist ideology may then lead to subsequent engagement with the 
ideology and can possibly result in continued communication between individuals 
and others who share extremist views.  
Platforms like Instagram, Twitter or Facebook, among others provide a 
context where interested individuals can ask questions about an organization, ranging 





For some, the internet can provide ideas about expertise, ideology and co-offenders, 
as well as strategies for who to attack and how (Gill et al., 2017; Weimann, 2016). 
LaFree (2017) notes that even though engagement with extremist narratives is not 
dependent on the internet, the internet creates an additional space that can foster 
violent extremism. Gill et al. (2017) explain that violent radicalization is cyber-
enabled; the internet operates in different ways for different people. Due to the 
extensive reach of social media and its ability to spread ideological content, it is 
important to understand what role, if any, social media plays in encouraging violent 
extremism as compared to non-violent extremism.  
According to business strategists Ruder Finn Innovation Studios Asia, 
Facebook monitors user behavior to personalize advertisements based on an 
individual’s interests, political views, travel habits, and preferred news sources (Ko, 
2016). By creating algorithms1 to alter the content presented to users, Facebook 
attracts the business of companies looking to advertise their products (“How Does 
Facebook Make Its Money?,” n.d.). Although social media platforms like Facebook 
have developed algorithms with a goal of making profits, the use of these algorithms 
may push individuals with similar interests together, creating “echo chambers.”  
O’Hara and Stevens (2015) define echo chambers as homogenous settings that 
increase exposure to like-minded information over contradictory views. Echo 
chambers can influence the information that individuals see and thus, may alter the 
frequency of exposure to certain definitions. Specifically, Pauwels and Schils (2016) 
                                                 
1 An algorithm is a computer code that allows platforms to alter content to show individuals posts they 





discuss echo chambers on social media as settings where the mechanisms of social 
learning (differential association, differential reinforcement, definitions and imitation) 
are present and may influence the development of extremist ideologies.  
Though the technological advancements that have allowed for the growth and 
development of social media occurred after Sutherland originally explained 
differential association, Sutherland doubted that any type of media would have the 
same impact on learning as face to face interaction. According to Sutherland (1947), 
differential association occurs only from face-to-face environments and in-person 
interaction. As highlighted by Cressey (1965), the presence of intimate groups is 
extremely important in learning. Cressey also argues that sources like movies, 
television and newspapers are not important and though they can expose the 
individual to some delinquent ideas, these ideas will not manifest into behavior unless 
they are reinforced by an intimate group (Cressey, 1965; Empey, 1978). Challenging 
these explanations, Akers (2009) explains that media (such as TV, movies, and video 
games) can have significant influences on learning through imitation and vicarious 
reinforcement. He highlights that along with primary groups, media sources can also 
have effects in exposure to criminal patterns and behavior models.  
Given the ability of social media platforms, like Facebook, to create intimate 
groups (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), it is plausible that social media may be important 
when considering the learning process. Currently, learning theorists have not 
adequately considered the possibility that interactions on social media could be 






To date, with few exceptions, there has been little research that compares 
extremists who engage in violence to those who use non-violent actions in support of 
their ideology (Borum, 2011a; Della Porta & LaFree, 2011). Borum (2011) highlights 
engagement in extremist behavior as a complex process that occurs at diverse stages 
characterized by different mechanisms. These mechanisms interact in various 
contexts for different people, emphasizing the importance of understanding 
differences when researching engagement in extremist behavior (Borum, 2011). 
Borum also calls for the use of social science theories to aid in further understanding 
these differences. Though some extant research has applied criminological theories to 
violent extremism, further research may prove beneficial in understanding this 
process. Specifically, when considering SLT, we know that intimate groups are the 
source of differential associations (Cressey, 1965). However, it is important to 
consider that groups can develop both online and offline. Klinger and Svensson 
(2014:10) argue that social media platforms may be able to create these groups as 
they facilitate “geographically spread niche networks” where like-minded individuals 
can socialize. While extant research examines the role of peers in violent extremism, 
it does not adequately address how both online and offline networks interact and lead 
to violent extremism.  
Though efforts have been made to identify the factors frequently related to 
violent extremism, most of this literature remains unconvincing (Neumann & 
Kleinmann, 2013; Gill, 2015). Additionally, none of the current projects on 
radicalization include at-risk individuals who did not radicalize to the point of 





in violence to those who do not engage in violence, radicalization literature fails to 
understand the pathway from ideology to violence among those who are ideologically 
committed (Borum, 2011b). The proposed study seeks to add to criminological 
literature on both violent extremism and the influence of social media by using SLT 
as a framework for understanding how these outlets may play a role in violent 
extremism. Extant literature by Suler (2004), Holt (2007) and Holt et al. (2015), 
discusses the changes in beliefs that can occur on social media and the transition of 
these beliefs to the off-line world. However, current literature on the impact of social 
media on subsequent violence is lacking and what exists has many limitations. While 
prior research suggests that social networks and peer relationships can influence 
engagement in violent extremism (Sageman, 2004; Lafree, Jensen, James, & Safer-
Lichtenstein, 2018), it fails to adequately address how online peer relationships may 
influence extremist behavior as well. 
In the current study, I use the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the 
United States (PIRUS) dataset collected by the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) to understand the relationship 
between exposure to social media during radicalization and engagement in violent 
extremism. As defined by the PIRUS team, radicalization is “the psychological, 
emotional and behavioral processes by which an individual or group adopts an 
ideology that promotes the use of violence for the attainment of political, economic, 
religious, or social goals” (Jensen et al., 2016: 8). In this thesis, I explore the 
following research questions: (1) Are political extremists with social media exposure 





other ideologically motivated political extremists? and (2) Are political extremists 
with exposure to a social media platform using personalization algorithms more likely 
to engage in violent extremism, compared to other ideologically motivated political 
extremists?  
The sample consists of 347 individuals who engaged in ideologically 
motivated illegal behavior in the United States between the years of 2005 and 2016. 
The restriction of 2005 as the earliest year is due to decisions by the PIRUS team to 
only code social media information on those individuals whose ideologically 
motivated behavior took place during or after 2005. Other sources such as Duggan 
and Brenner (2013) also identify 2005 as the earliest date of data collection on social 
media usage. In this research, I explore whether SLT offers a useful framework for 
understanding the influence of social media in creating an environment that fosters 
engagement in violent extremism, and whether there is an additional effect of social 
media on violent extremism for those individuals who report having radicalized social 
networks.  
 In the forthcoming paper, I begin with an overview of relevant literature to 
understand SLT and its current applications to violent extremism. Then, I discuss the 
concept of social media as a mechanism for social learning that may lead to 
engagement in violent extremism. In the next section, I review relevant literature on 
SLT, social media and violent extremism. Next, I include an explanation of the 
PIRUS data, my analytic plan, the independent and dependent variables, as well as 





results and conclude with a discussion of relevant findings, including limitations and 
future directions. 
Chapter 2: Social Learning Theory:  Literature Review 
Sutherland’s (1947) theory of differential association claims that criminal 
behavior is learned, just as any type of behavior is learned. “Criminals learn both the 
techniques of committing crime and the definitions favorable to crime” (Sutherland 
and Cressey, 1960: 78). Sutherland defines differential association, the main 
proposition of the theory, as occurring when “a person becomes delinquent because 
of an excess of definitions favorable to law violation over definitions unfavorable to 
violation of law” (Sutherland & Cressey, 1960: 78).  Differential associations can 
fluctuate in duration, priority, intensity and frequency; meaning that the likelihood of 
learning a definition increases when an individual is exposed to that definition more 
often, for longer periods of time, at an earlier time, and from an intimate individual. 
Sutherland (1947) explains that the process through which individuals learn these 
definitions is not any different from the process through which they learn prosocial 
behavior. The learning process encompasses multiple different aspects including 
techniques, interpretations of the law, rationalizations, and motives and attitudes 
about crime. 
Learning occurs through direct communication with others, solely intimate 
personal groups (Cressey, 1965; Cullen et al., 2014). Sutherland (1947) highlights 
these intimate groups as being integral to the learning process and cites contact with 
these groups as the critical element of differential association. When explaining the 





“what we should study if we are going to establish a theory for explaining criminal 
conduct, is in a word, words.” Individuals do not inherently lack self-control, rather 
they learn criminal behavior through justifications from intimate personal groups that 
include symbols and, more importantly, language (Empey, 1978). Cressey (1965:51) 
also explains that “criminal behavior is, like other behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, and 
values which a person exhibits, the property of groups, not of individuals.” This focus 
on the importance of closeness between personal contacts suggests that interaction 
with non-intimate communication (for example, television or radio) will not have the 
same effect as communication with intimate groups (Cressey, 1965). However, as 
Klinger and Svensson (2015) explain social media can foster the development of 
networks independent of geographic barriers, it  may then be plausible that these 
online networks may also influence the duration, priority, intensity and frequency of 
definitions. 
Akers’ (1990) social learning theory (SLT) extends Sutherland’s (1947) 
differential association model and aims to explain the mechanisms through which 
learning occurs. While Sutherland (1947) explains that individuals learn criminal 
behavior through communication with others, his theory lacks an explanation of the 
causal mechanisms of how these definitions translate to criminal behavior. Akers’ 
argument is rooted in Sutherland’s belief that individuals learn to participate in crime 
through their exposure and adoption of definitions that support crime but goes on to 
be a much broader theory that includes aspects of behavior procurement, persistence 
and desistence (Akers, 1985). The likelihood that an individual will engage in deviant 





when they differentially associate with others who promote definitions that support 
criminal behavior and engage in criminal behavior themselves (Akers, 1998). The 
individual’s high level of exposure to notable deviant models, their ideas about the 
desirability of criminal behavior in certain situations and their perceptions of greater 
rewards than punishments for their behavior can mediate the process of differential 
association (Akers, 1998). Akers (2009) counters Sutherland’s description of media 
as “relatively unimportant” (Sutherland, 1947: 6) and explains how it can have 
significant influences on individuals through the mechanisms of learning. 
 Specifically, Akers (1989; 1990) explains that this learning process occurs 
through four mechanisms identified as differential association, definitions, 
differential reinforcement and imitations that have a causal effect on an individual’s 
delinquent behavior. Differential association is operationalized similarly to 
Sutherland’s definition and Akers contends that the contexts where someone develops 
differential associations are the same contexts that expose them to the rest of the 
mechanisms of social learning. The most important groups are family and close 
friends, but other groups that develop from schools, churches and neighborhood 
contexts can influence the individual as well.  
In SLT, Akers et al. (1989) explain definitions as attitudes and rationalizations 
that an individual gives to a specific behavior. These definitions are what categorize 
engagement in a behavior as right or wrong. The likelihood of an individual engaging 
in a behavior increases when their attitudes support that behavior and decreases when 
their attitudes do not support that behavior (Akers et al., 1989). Definitions are beliefs 





individual to engage in crime. Additionally, Akers et al. (1989) explain differential 
reinforcement as an individual’s perception of the rewards and punishments of 
engaging in a behavior. When deciding to engage in a behavior an individual will 
weigh past and present experiences along with perceptions of future rewards and 
punishments (Akers et al., 1989). The final element of SLT, imitation, is the idea that 
individuals are more likely to engage in a behavior after seeing another person 
engaging in that behavior. The person engaging in the behavior (primary vs. 
secondary social group) and the specific behavior can moderate this imitation process. 
All four of these mechanisms interact in time and across different opportunity 
structures to create contexts in which crime can occur. Akers (1990) explains that 
there are reciprocal and feedback effects within these mechanisms that make up a 
complex process of social learning. 
Akers (2009) explains that primary groups made up of family are important in 
the early stages of an individual’s life, but beginning at adolescence other sources, 
such as the media, can be important. According to Akers, the media (i.e. TV, movies 
and video games) can effect individuals through modeling, reinforcement, and moral 
desensitization toward criminal behavior. The media may provide either neutralizing 
or positive definitions for a specific behavior.  Specifically, for an expanding 
proportion of people, the priority, duration, frequency and intensity of exposure to 
content presented in the media has become so strong that it can even outweigh 
opposing views from primary groups with whom contact has become less frequent, 





sources of criminal and noncriminal behavior models as sources for imitation (Akers, 
2009).   
Looking at extant research, Pratt et al. (2010) find support for SLT in the 
criminological literature; however, there is a limited application of SLT to 
understanding violent extremism. Extensive literature on SLT highlights well 
supported evidence that peers are extremely important to the learning process (Cullen, 
Agnew & Wilcox, 2014). Knowing that peer relationships are an important source of 
social learning, it is only logical to ask whether peers influence violent extremism as 
well. 
Using SLT to Explain Political Violence 
Traditionally, criminologists have applied SLT to understand the dichotomy 
between an individual engaging in crime and not engaging in crime.  However, when 
differentiating between those who engage in political extremism, LaFree et al. (2018) 
find support for the explanatory power of criminological theories to differentiate 
between violent and non-violent behavior. Specifically, LaFree et al. (2018) apply 
social control, SLT, and other criminological perspectives to understand engagement 
in violent political extremism compared to non-violent political extremism. Looking 
specifically at the merit of applying SLT to engagement in political violence, LaFree 
et al. (2018) find that radical peers have a significant positive effect on an 
individual’s engagement in violent extremism compared to non-violent extremism.  
Similarly, Becker (2017) aims to understand whether SLT, social bonds 
theory, and interactional theory have any explanatory power when it comes to 





findings suggest that social bonds decrease the likelihood of violent extremism while 
SLT related variables are associated with an increased likelihood of violent 
extremism compared to non-violent extremism. Becker (2017) suggests that there is 
some merit in not only applying criminological theories to terrorism research, but also 
using these schools of thought to explain the dichotomy between violent and non-
violent extremism.  
These findings (Becker, 2017; LaFree et al., 2018) suggest that social learning 
from peers may influence violent political extremism differentially that non-violent 
political extremism. However, the characteristics of these peers and an understanding 
of where these relationships come from are both unknown. Due to the growth of 
social media platforms, peer networks can manifest both online and offline calling for 
research to understand whether SLT is applicable to online experiences and may lead 
to violence from online experiences the same way it does for offline experiences.  
Additionally, though not a direct application of SLT, Sageman (2004) 
identifies friends and family as playing an important role in the organization of 
terrorist networks. His explanation supports LaFree et al. (2018) and Becker’s (2017) 
findings that SLT can explain the influence peers have on violent extremism.  
Sageman explains that it is not formal organizations but close networks of friends and 
family that connect individuals to the group. Sageman (2004) also argues that friends 
can have a direct impact on an individual’s behavior through imitation as friends can 
serve as examples through which individuals learn about and join groups. Based on 
this research, friends and peer networks appear to influence an individual’s own 





networks that are face-to-face, it may be possible to extend these relationships to 
online networks. It is plausible then that peer networks on social media can serve as 
an influence to lead individuals on a path toward violent extremism as well, similarly 
to those found in face-to-face peer networks.  
The relationship between online exposure and offline behavior 
To study the relationship between social media and violent extremism, it is 
important to first understand whether online experiences can transition to behavioral 
changes offline. Suler (2004) suggests that due to “online disinhibition,” individuals 
will be able to distinguish between their online and offline lives and may not translate 
online experiences to offline behavior. According to Suler, the online disinhibition 
effect occurs when “people say and do things in cyberspace that they wouldn’t 
ordinarily say and do in the face-to-face world. They loosen up, feel less restrained 
and express themselves more openly” (p. 321). Suler discusses multiple factors in 
cyberspace that allow individuals to express suppressed feelings through the 
deterioration of psychological barriers.  The main factor of dissociative anonymity 
occurs when individuals can distinguish between their online and off-line lives and 
therefore do not feel as vulnerable expressing their feelings online. The internet also 
allows for invisibility, through which individuals can maintain anonymity, and 
asynchronicity where people do not interact in real time and thus do not have to cope 
with another’s reactions immediately. Additionally, Suler defines solipsistic 
introjection as occurring when an individual reads another person’s messages as a 
voice in their own head and this message intertwines with their own psyche. This 





from the realities of the offline world. According to Suler, by minimizing the impact 
of status, wealth, race, or gender the online world puts everyone on an even playing 
field and creates an ideal environment for online disinhibition to occur.  
While Suler (2004) argues that disinhibition will manifest as a disconnect 
between an individual’s online and offline behavior, Pyrooz et al (2015) explain two 
different ways that behaviors and identities are developed online. The first 
manifestation is “web-facilitated,” where individuals create a secret version of 
themselves that is separate from friends, family, co-workers and law enforcement. For 
these individuals, groups of like-minded others in online communities facilitate their 
deviant behavior, allowing individuals to preserve their anonymity. The second group 
are considered “web-enhanced,” where the online persona reflects the individual’s 
offline behavior and identity. Weimann (2006) explains that it is through this 
manifestation of online identities that ideological debates take place online that lead 
to violence offline. For these individuals there is a blurred line between their online 
and offline identity and behavior, which leads to fluidity between their online and 
offline worlds (Pyrooz, Decker, & Moule, 2015).  
With the “web-enhanced” manifestation, Holt (2007; 2015) suggests that 
online activity can translate into offline behavior. Studying hackers specifically, Holt 
(2007) argues that hacker subculture can transcend the digital world and influence 
relationships in the offline world. According to Holt, cyberspace has allowed for the 
creation of many deviant and criminal subcultures fostering the development of social 
movements around the globe. A message posted on Facebook or any other web forum 





supporters. In this way, social media is integral to creating a collective identity, which 
can transition online activism to offline behavior. By allowing individuals to maintain 
communication with others, social media provides the context for individuals to 
become socialized to the main elements of a movement (Holt, Freilich, Chermak, & 
McCauley, 2015; Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003).  
The exposure to definitions on social media creates a space where some 
individuals may take on the definitions they see. Not all individuals who hold 
extremist ideas will transition into violent behavior, but social media may aid this 
transition by driving interested individuals toward videos and propaganda that 
promote violence over non-violence (Pauwels & Schils, 2016a). The transition of 
online beliefs to offline behavior is imperative to understand in the context of social 
media exposure to extremist content and violent extremism. Given that beliefs 
developed in cyberspace can extend to the off-line world (Holt, 2007; 2015; Pyrooz et 
al., 2015), exposure to extremist content online may have behavioral consequences 
for violent extremism in the off-line world. 
The influence of social media on behavior 
Extant literature has aimed to study the influence of social media on the 
development of extremist attitudes and behaviors in different ways. Pauwels and 
Schils (2016) use SLT as a framework when studying exposure to extremist content 
on social media and subsequent political violence. Using self-reports from Belgian 
adolescents and young adults, the study analyzes the relationship between exposure to 
extremist content through social media and self-reported political violence. The 





violence against property (i.e. damaging property), for political or religious reasons. 
The independent variables include multiple measures of exposure to extremist content 
on social media. Pauwels and Schils (2016) hypothesize that extremist content on 
social media is related to political violence when controlling for background variables 
(i.e. age, religion, nativity), strain variables, moral values, peer influences, and 
personality characteristics (i.e. low self-control, moral values).   
The results support Pauwels and Schils (2016) hypothesis, as they find that 
exposure to extremist content online has positive significant impacts on both self-
reported politically motivated violence against property and people. The results show 
significant effects for those individuals who actively turn to extremist narratives 
online rather than those who accidentally interact with extremist content. 
Additionally, the findings suggest that offline relationships with delinquent and racist 
friends have a significant association with self-reported political violence. Though it 
appears that online exposure to extremist content is associated with both property 
violence and violence against persons, limitations inherent to self-reports of young 
adults and youth, such as memory recall and other self-reporting biases might 
influence the validity of these measures. Due to these limitations, an extension of this 
application of SLT could measure the difference between engagement in politically 
motivated property violence and violence against persons using measures of known 
behavior. Pauwels and Schils (2016) treat both acts against people and against 
property as violent behaviors, though these behaviors may be distinctive and can 





perspectives that may also explain political violence thus moderating the support for 
SLT. 
Additionally, research by Kramer et al. (2014) finds that changes in exposure 
to material on social media can manifest in attitudinal changes in individuals. Using 
an experimental design, the researchers test whether exposure to other people’s 
emotions on Facebook leads to an individual posting content that expresses the same 
emotions. After manipulating exposure to both positive and negative emotions, 
evidence shows that increased exposure to a specific emotion is related to an 
increased presence of that emotion in subsequent Facebook statuses over a 1-week 
period. These findings provide evidence that exposure to other people’s behavior on 
social media can affect an individual’s subsequent behavior. At some level, this might 
support the SLT principle of imitation, that by seeing others post negative or positive 
messages individuals are more likely to then adopt those respective emotions 
themselves. Though these findings do not necessarily support the idea that exposure 
to content online will manifest into offline behavior, they emphasize that exposure 
online can alter future online behavior.  
Extant research shows that exposure to content on social media can relate to 
the elements of SLT (Kramer et al., 2015) and that SLT is applicable to understanding 
violent extremism (Becker, 2017; LaFree et al., 2018; Pauwels & Schils, 2016). 
Additionally, knowing that peer groups are important for engagement with extremist 
ideology (Sageman, 2004), that intimate groups are the critical element of SLT 





Svensson, 2015), I propose the following hypothesis about the relationship between 
radicalization on social media and engagement in violent extremism:  
H1: Compared to other ideologically motivated political extremists, those with 
social media exposure during their radicalization will be more likely to engage in 
violent extremism.  
Social Media Algorithms and SLT 
 
As previously explained, intimate groups are the integral part of differential 
association and by influencing the creation of these groups and exposure to certain 
content, social media platforms can manipulate the mechanisms of social learning by 
changing the frequency, duration and intensity of messages.  Platforms like Facebook 
track a user’s likes, shares, comments and even measure how much time they spend 
on posts to understand their content preferences. Facebook (and others) tailors users’ 
news feeds to show content that is specific to their interests ensuring their continued 
usage of the platform (Ko, 2016). By keeping users interested, social media platforms 
can continue to target them with specific advertisements that serve as both profits and 
fit within their identified business model. As explained by Dijck and Poell (2013), 
social media organizations aim to connect either users to each other or users to 
advertisers by using personalization algorithms. The goal of these algorithms is to 
make social media more individualized and interesting to users, but extant research 
explains that they may lead to the creation of echo chambers that could potentially 
have negative consequences for users (Klinger and Svensson, 2014). 
O’Hara and Stevens (2015: 402) define echo chambers as homogenous 





opposing ideas. Echo chambers are created on social media by what is known as a 
filter bubble (Pauwels, Brion, Schils, & Easton, 2014). A filter bubble changes the 
individual’s environment and “dictates which opportunities and immediate situations 
are made available” in a process through which “certain content [is] made more 
available or even recommended to them based on the algorithm’s perceptions of their 
preferences” (Wolfowicz, n.d. : 1). The personalization algorithms’ function as a 
filter bubble allowing for the content a user sees and/or does not see to change based 
on their past behavior. After a period of time, individuals are confined to these filter 
bubbles that are personalized and can create further exposure to their own biases 
(Hawdon, 2012). This filter bubble then leads to the presence of echo chambers by 
increasing exposure to certain beliefs and allowing for differential reinforcement of 
these beliefs.  
The algorithm’s process of filtering content creates positive feedback loops 
where previous engagement with certain media results in continued exposure to 
similar content. Additionally, these feedback loops lead to a reduction in exposure to 
contradictory definitions. By only presenting one-sided definitions, feedback loops 
increase differential reinforcement and allow differential associations to develop that 
reinforce violence over non-violence (Wood, 2017).  In cases where an echo chamber 
develops around certain views, this can lead to an increase in the frequency of 
exposure to messages in support of these ideas. This process can then foster learning 
and lead to an individual developing polarized views that are supportive of extremist 
ideology and violent behavior (Pauwels & Schils, 2016a; Wolfowicz, n.d.). These 





to develop more extreme opinions that then lead to them engaging in violence over 
non-violence in support of their ideology.  
Sunstein (2007; 2009) explains echo chambers as the context through which 
the internet may be able to support political sovereignty. By leading individuals to 
like-minded posts and information, echo chambers create a space in which 
polarization can occur (O’Hara & Stevens, 2015). Within echo chambers, extreme 
narratives are able to drown out the more moderate views resulting in an environment 
characterized by polarized attitudes supporting violent extremism over non-violent 
extremism (Davies, Neudecker, Ouellet, Bouchard, & Ducol, 2016; Geeraerts, 2012).  
O’Hara and Stevens (2015) discuss three ways in which the internet could 
lead to this polarization. First, due to the personalization of messages, those in online 
settings begin to see an increased amount of information supporting one side of an 
argument. Second, this leads individuals to adopt these definitions themselves. 
Finally, the development of extreme positions leads these individuals to unify with 
their peers who share these ideas and this unity circles back to further the 
development of their extreme positions (O’Hara & Stevens, 2015).  
According to Neumann (2013), there is no one piece of online propaganda 
that will radicalize an individual; rather, online radicalization is a gradual process 
related to the duration of exposure to content. Echo chambers can create an 
environment where definitions supportive of extreme positions will become 
normalized by increasing the frequency of exposure to these definitions (Pauwels & 
Schils, 2016a). For example, due to the homogeneity of definitions presented, there is 





individuals to view violence as commendable and prestigious. Not only do echo 
chambers influence attitudes, but they can also provide exposure to other individuals 
who have engaged in violent political extremism. The exposure to these behaviors 
can lead to an individual imitating these behaviors themselves (Pauwels & Schils, 
2016a). Echo chambers may then foster polarization leading to growth of extreme 
views in support of violence over non-violence. 
The impact of personalization algorithms 
Any argument that personalization algorithms are deterministic and can 
dictate everything an individual is shown on social media is naïve, as it would ignore 
the role that individual behavior plays in the development of an echo chamber. Bessi 
et al. (2016) analyze cognitive factors that lead individuals to become involved in 
echo chambers by analyzing the behavior of users with the same content on Facebook 
and YouTube. The study explores user interaction with videos posted on science and 
conspiracy pages, citing these as contradictory messages, where science seeks to 
dispel tested knowledge and conspiracy messages aim to spread unconfirmed rumors. 
The study sample consists of 400 users who have commented at least 100 times on 
social media. This sample allows an understanding of the polarization process as it 
occurs through an individual’s commenting behavior.  
In the findings, it appears that some individuals only comment on one type of 
online content from the beginning while others begin by interacting with information 
supporting multiple narratives. Within this latter group, individuals end up polarized 
in one of the two narratives. During this process, behavioral changes can manifest as 





al. (2016) find support that exposure to contrasting evidence forces individuals to 
interact with one or the other type of information and brings them into an echo 
chamber where they become more frequently exposed to supporting definitions of 
these narratives. It is evident that echo chambers play a role in exposure to content on 
social media for those well exposed to a certain ideology, as well as those with 
limited exposure to this ideology.  
Looking specifically at the ability of algorithms to alter definitions presented 
to users on social media, Bakshy et al.  (2015) find that in the presence of a 
personalization algorithm there was an 8% decrease in exposure to opposing views 
for liberal users and a 5% decrease for conservative users. These results offer support 
for the notion that algorithms can manipulate the definitions presented and result in a 
decrease in the exposure to content opposing an individual’s current views leading to 
an increased presence of one-sided definitions. Additionally, Nikolov and colleagues 
(2015) find a similar reduction in definitions, citing that, due to algorithms on 
Facebook, 25% of politically conservative users saw a decrease in exposure to 
contrary views, while liberal users saw a 50% reduction of contrary views. Both 
Bakshy et al. (2015) and Nikolov and colleagues (2015) find decreases in contrary 
views for both politically conservative and liberal individuals, suggesting that 
algorithms may influence the exposure to certain definitions. The exposure to one-
sided definitions may then influence differential association. Given the support that 
algorithms on social media can alter exposure to certain definitions over others and 






H2: Compared to other ideologically motivated political extremists, those with 
exposure to a social media platform using personalization algorithms will be more 
likely to engage in violent extremism. 
To summarize, I will use PIRUS data to examine the relationship between 
radicalization on social media and violent extremism. By using SLT as a framework 
for this relationship, I aim to answer two main research questions: (1) Are political 
extremists with social media exposure during their radicalization more likely to 
engage in violent extremism, compared to other ideologically motivated political 
extremists? and (2) Are political extremists with exposure to a social media platform 
using personalization algorithms more likely to engage in violent extremism, 
compared to other ideologically motivated political extremists?  
Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
 
In this chapter I describe the data and methodology that I use in this thesis. I 
begin with an explanation of the PIRUS dataset, including a description of data 
collection and strengths and weaknesses of the data. I then discuss the analytic 
sample, followed by the dependent and independent variables that I used in this 
analysis. Following this discussion, I explain the methodology beginning with a 
discussion of missing data followed by a description of the logistic regression 
analysis. 
Data 
PIRUS is a cross-sectional dataset built using information from publicly 





and 2016. The dataset includes individuals who espouse Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, 
or Single Issue2 ideologies and have engaged in either violent or non-violent actions 
motivated by their ideology.  
The PIRUS research team conducted data collection and coding in multiple 
stages. Using a multitude of publicly available open sources3, START researchers 
began by searching for any individuals known to have radicalized in the United States 
and recorded preliminary information on these individuals.  This original list 
contained 3,900 individuals subsequently coded based on a set of inclusion criteria 
(explained below) to determine suitability for inclusion in the dataset in the second 
stage of data collection. All information was coded from open sources including 
publicly available court documents, newspapers (e.g. Wall Street Journal, The New 
York Times), public FBI reports, the Southern Poverty Law Center, peer-reviewed 
academic journal articles, police reports, and  journalistic accounts (books and 
documentaries), among others (Jensen et al., 2016). 
All individuals included in the PIRUS dataset had to meet a specific set of 
inclusion criteria. Individuals must have radicalized in the United States, have 
espoused or currently espouse (at time of extremist behavior) ideological motives, 
and there must be evidence that their behavior is linked to the ideological motives 
he/she espoused or espouses. In addition to these criteria, the individual must also 
                                                 
2 The PIRUS codebook defines those with a single issue ideology as “motivated by a single issue, 
rather than a broad ideology.” For example, this includes groups like the Puerto Rican independence 
movement, anti-abortion extremists, and members of the Jewish Defense League, among others.  
3 The specific sources utilized by the research team include newspapers, websites (e.g. government, 
terrorist group, research centers/institutions), books, documentaries, court records, police reports, peer-
reviewed articles, LexisNexis, any information posted by the individual being researched (e.g. social 





meet one of the following five criteria: (1) was arrested, (2) was indicted for a crime, 
(3) was killed as a result of his or her ideological activities, (4) is/was a member of a 
designated terrorist organization4, or (5) was associated with an extremist 
organization whose leader(s) or founder(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically 
motivated violent offense. The inclusion criteria focus on radicalization that occurs 
inside the United States, meaning that the individual’s radicalization process began 
and most, if not all, of it occurred while they lived in the United States.  
After determining which individuals met the inclusion criteria (from the list of 
3,900), researchers randomly sampled this list and coded the selected individuals for 
the 147 variables included in the dataset5. The variables included in the dataset cover 
relevant background, contextual and ideological information on the individuals and 
are antecedent to their date of engagement in either violent or non-violent extremist 
behavior. After coding the initial random sample, researchers went back over three 
waves and included those individuals from their original list who fit the inclusion 
criteria. To ensure reliability among coders, approximately 10% of the individuals in 
the data were double-coded. This allowed researchers to use the Krippendorf’s alpha 
procedure to test for inter-rater reliability in these double-coded cases.  Researchers 
calculated three different scores for each wave of data collection; (1) 0.68, (2) 0.73, 
and (3) 0.76. Using 0.7 as the standard for acceptable reliability, Jensen et al. (2016) 
                                                 
4 By the PIRUS research team, membership is defined very broadly and includes cases where the 
individual is declared by the government to be part of the organization, is tied to the group in the media 
or if they claim membership with a group without the acknowledgement of the organization (Jensen et 
al., 2016) 
5 It is unclear how many individuals met the inclusion criteria at this time and how many were included 





are confident in the reliability of the data and highlight that coding practices 
improved with each wave of data collection.  
 During these initial phases of data collection, PIRUS researchers did not 
collect information on social media usage, however, later retrospectively coded 
additional variables (including social media usage) for those cases in the sample 
where individuals engaged in extremist behavior in 2005 or later. The PIRUS team 
coded the social media variables using the same methodology as the rest of the 
variables and specifically searched for information about the platforms used by the 
individual, the role social media played in their radicalization, the activities they 
engaged in on social media and the frequency of their social media usage. At present, 
the complete PIRUS dataset includes 1,867 individuals engaged in extremist behavior 
between 1947 and 2016 coded on 162 variables.  
Strengths and limitations of PIRUS 
Given that researchers collected data from a variety of open sources, the depth 
of information available is highly dependent on the reporting behavior of these news 
sources. Though the PIRUS team identifies specific criteria that an individual must 
meet before researchers consider them suitable for inclusion in the data set, these 
criteria overlook the critical first step.  For inclusion in the dataset, an individual must 
first come to the attention of either law enforcement or the media. This excludes 
individuals who engage in extremism but remain unidentified. 
According to the Final Report of PIRUS released by START (2016), the 
PIRUS team undertook a conservative coding strategy to address the gaps in 





explicitly stated in any sources as missing, rather than treating it as “not occurring”. 
This strategy is commonly used across other datasets that also rely on open sources 
for data collection (Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017)  However, given 
this process there are concerns with missing data in PIRUS.  
Despite these limitations, PIRUS is still useful for studying the proposed 
relationship because it currently provides the most extensive available data on the 
attributes, backgrounds and behaviors of extremist individuals in the United States 
(Jensen et al, 2016). Moreover, compared to past research on extremism, PIRUS 
includes individuals who have engaged in both violent and non-violent extremism. 
According to Borum (2011), extant research lacks this variation in the dependent 
variable as most of these data sources only include individuals who have engaged in 
violent extremism and exclude those who engage in non-violent actions motivated by 
their ideology. Additionally, much of the past research has focused only on one 
specific ideology and PIRUS includes those who have engaged in extremist behavior 
across multiple ideologies (Jensen et al, 2016). The inclusion of 162 individual level 
variables has made PIRUS a comprehensive data source available to study the 
relationships between these individual attributes and engagement in both violent and 
non-violent extremism. 
Analytic Sample 
In this study, I restrict the sample using two separate criteria. The first is that I 
only include those individuals whose ideologically motivated behavior took place 
during or after 2005. I use this sample restriction because social media usage first 





before this time would not have had the opportunity to be exposed to social media. 
Second, I only include those cases which have complete information on the 
dependent variable (violent-nonviolent) and the two independent variables  (exposure 
to social media and whether the platforms they use employ personalization 
algorithms). By restricting the sample to those with complete information on these 
two variables, I can test my hypotheses without using missing data strategies to 
estimate the primary variables of interest.  The analytic sample used for this research 
consists of 347 observations.  
Variables 
In Table 1, I list all the variables included in the analysis and report also the 
proportion of observations for each variable that are missing.  To test the 
hypothesized relationships, I use a dependent variable, Violent, and a set of 
independent variables along with control variables. The following section explains 
the way these variables are operationalized and why they are important for inclusion 
in this analysis. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name N Mean Std. Dev Min Max % Missing 
Violent 347 .697 .460 0 1 0.00 
Social Media 347 .542 .499 0 1 0.00 
Algorithm  347 .504 .501 0 1 0.00 
Intimate Social Group 284 .447 .498 0 1 18.16 
Group Membership 347 .637 .482 0 1 0.00 
Education 193 .575 .496 0 1 44.38 
Male 347 .922 .268 0 1 0.00 
Previous Criminal Activity  242 .748 1.06 0 3 30.26 
Far Right 347 .331 .471 0 1 0.00 
Islamist 347 .516 .500 0 1 0.00 





Foreign Fighter 347 .352 .478 0 1 0.00 
Year 347 2011.49 3.519 2005 2016 0.00 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, Violent, is a dichotomous variable that measures if an 
individual engaged in violent extremism. This measure captures the first ideologically 
motivated behavior reported in publicly available sources. Because all individuals 
included in the data have committed some type of illegal behavior, this variable 
distinguishes between violent and non-violent behavior. Those individuals coded as 
violent (=1) must have actively participated in an operation/attack that either resulted 
in or intended to result in casualties or injuries. Additionally, individuals charged with 
conspiracy to kill or injure but were interdicted in the plotting phase are also coded as 
violent. Specific behaviors accounted for in this measure include murder, assault, 
armed robbery, kidnapping, bombing and arson. Comparatively, behaviors considered 
non-violent (=0) include illegal protests, vandalism, possession of illegal weapons, 
and tax fraud, among others. When coding Violent, researchers made specific 
decisions to treat a case as violent in a situation where the individual intended to 
cause death or injury to another person and had a plan for violence, though 
unsuccessful. Researchers worked to identify intent and in cases where intent for 
violence was not present they treated that behavior as non-violent. For example, 
though arson is considered violent, if it was apparent from sources that the individual 
tried to avoid human injury (e.g., burning a business in the middle of the night) then 
researchers would treat this as a non-violent behavior because it lacked intent of 





for inclusion in the data, there is no missing data on this variable. Violent is 
temporally the last variable in the data and all other variables are antecedent to this 
ideologically motivated violent or non-violent behavior6. Within the sample, 69.7% 
of individuals engaged in violent extremism.   
Independent Variables  
The independent variable, Social Media, is a dummy variable measuring 
whether the individual was exposed to online social media during their radicalization 
and/or mobilization. Online social media can encompass any type of electronic 
platform that allows users to communicate by creating online communities to share 
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content like videos and images. In 
this study, online social media includes Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Vimeo, 
Instagram, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, MySpace, 4chan, Reddit, Ask.fm, 
WhatsApp, Kik, Paltalk, VK, personal blogging websites (e.g. Wordpress, Blogger, 
LiveJournal, etc.), other non-encrypted software, and other encrypted or unspecified 
encrypted software.  
For the current study, this variable is recoded from its original coding as (0) 
no evidence that social media played a role, (1) played a role but was not the primary 
means of radicalization or mobilization and (3) was the primary means of 
radicalization for the individual. Here, I dichotomize Social Media as a “yes” (=1) for 
individuals for whom social media (1) played a role but was not the primary means of 
                                                 
6 Any information reported in the sources pertaining to events after the date of engagement in the 
identified ideologically motivated behavior is excluded and not represented in any of the variables in 





radicalization or mobilization or (2) was the primary means of radicalization for the 
individual, and “no” (=0) for individuals for whom social media did not a play a role 
in their radicalization/mobilization. I find that 54.2% of the individuals in my sample 
report exposure to social media.  
Additionally, I use an independent variable, Algorithm, to measure the 
difference between exposure to platforms that use personalization algorithms (e.g. 
Facebook) and those that do not (e.g. WhatsApp). Since there is variation in the use 
of personalization algorithms among different social media platforms, this variable 
highlights the difference between these platforms and their influence on violent 
extremism.  
To create the Algorithm variable, I conducted a search of relevant sources 
(including official platform websites and news articles) to determine which of these 
platforms uses personalization algorithms and which does not7. When making this 
determination, I accounted for the time when each platform began using 
personalization to ensure that the algorithms were used prior to the ideologically 
motivated behavior engaged in by the individual using that platform. Of the 19 
different platforms included in the sample, 11 of them used algorithms8. I coded all 
individuals who used at least one social media platform that uses an algorithm as a 
“yes” (=1) and all individuals who used platforms that did not employ algorithms or 
did not use any type of social media (original measure Social Media=0) as the “no” 
                                                 
7 Sources used for determining the presence of algorithms included Agrwal (2016), Manjoo (2016), 
(Marie & Carlton (2015), Patel (2016), Salihefendic (2015), and Stone (2007). 
8 The platforms that I identified as using personalization are Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Vimeo, 





(=0) category. In my sample, 50.4% used at least one social media platform that 
employed an algorithm. 
Control Variables  
 I also include a set of control variables in the analysis. Specifically, these 
variables are Group Membership, Intimate Social Group, Education, Foreign Fighter, 
Previous Criminal Activity, Islamist, Age, Male, and Year.  
I include Group Membership, as a measure of engagement with an extremist 
group, as a control. Group membership can facilitate the use of social media as a 
method of inter-group communication and can also influence engagement in violent 
extremism (Europarat, 2007; Hoffman, 2017; Weimann, 2016). This variable is 
recoded from its ordinal categories as a dummy variable, to represent if the individual 
was a member of either an informal group of extremists or a formal extremist 
organization/movement (=1) or if the individuals was not a member of an extremist 
group or was a member of non-extremist (i.e. legal) groups (=0). Those involved in 
above ground groups do not have the exposure to definitions that support illegal 
behavior in support of the ideology, thus differentiating them from those individuals 
with memberships to extremist organizations. Slightly less than two thirds of the 
sample (63.7%) report engagement with an extremist group. 
I also control for whether an individual is engaged with a close group of 
extremist others, as these others can be a source of definitions favorable toward 
violent extremism. Intimate Social Group is a binary measure representing, “a close-
knit, insular, and exclusive group of people containing at least two individuals” 





other who also espouses an extremist ideology is coded as “yes” (=1) for this variable 
to represent the presence of extremist intimate social group and “no” (=0) for the 
absence of an extremist social group. Within the sample, 44.7% of extremists were 
engaged with an intimate social group. 
The models also include a control for the individuals’ level of education. 
Research suggests that educational attainment is related to social media usage. 
Specifically,  Greenwood et al. (2016) find that in 2016, individuals with a high 
school diploma or less are less likely to use social media platforms (Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram and LinkedIn) than those with at least some college education. If 
individuals with lower levels of education are less likely to use social media, then 
they may be less influenced by it as well. Additionally, past literature has shown that 
education can either be protective or a risk factor for violent extremism (Borum, 
2011b; Gartenstein-Ross, Grossman, 2009). Education is recoded as a binary measure 
representing if the individual has a high school education or less (=0) or at least some 
education past high school (=1). Slightly more than half of the sample (57.5%) report 
at least some education past high school.  
I also include Foreign Fighter in the models to control for whether the 
individual is a foreign fighter. Foreign fighters are defined as those individuals who 
attempted to or successfully left the United States to join a foreign extremist group. 
According to Weimann (2016), foreign fighters are more likely to use social media 
than other extremists because it is their primary way of communicating with others 





foreign fighters (=1) or other political extremists (=0). Foreign fighters make up 
35.2% of the sample.  
As established through extant criminological research, past offending can 
predict future offending (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Blumstein, Farrington, & 
Moitra, 1985; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). I include an independent variable 
for Previous Criminal Activity to capture any previous non-ideologically motivated 
criminal behavior that the individual may have engaged in. This variable is measured 
on a scale from 0 to 3 to control for the relationship between past criminal history and 
extremist violence. This scale measures (0) no previous criminal activity; (1) previous 
non-violent minor criminal activity (i.e. misdemeanor); (2) previous non-violent 
serious criminal activity (i.e. felony); and (3) previous violent crime. Less than half of 
the sample report a criminal history (40.9%), with only 12.4% reporting a previous 
violent crime.  
To account for the differences between ideological motives in their 
justifications for violence, all models include binary measures of Islamist and Far 
Right. Extant literature finds that acts motivated by an Islamist ideology are more 
likely to be violent than those by other ideologies (Piazza, 2009). Islamist is a binary 
measure coded as “yes” (=1) for those who espouse an Islamist ideology and “no” 
(=0) otherwise. Additionally, compared to single issue and Far Left ideologies, the 
Far Right ideology is also more highly supportive of extremist violence (Berlet and 
Lyons, 2000). Given this, I include Far Right as a binary measure coded as “yes” (=1) 
for those extremists who espouse a Far Right ideology and “no” (=0) for all other 





single issue ideologies. In this data, individuals following an Islamist ideology are 
51.6% of the sample and those following a Far Right ideology are 33.1%.  
The models also use additional demographic variables as controls. Due to a 
well-established relationship in the criminological literature between age and 
offending, Age is included to account for the changes in offending as individuals get 
older (Farrington, 1986; Blokland, Nagin, & Nieuwbeerta, 2005) and represents the 
individual’s age at the time of engagement in extremist behavior. Additionally, I use a 
variable measuring the individual’s gender in the model. Male is a binary measure 
where “yes” (=1) represents a male and “no” (=0) is a female.  The majority of the 
sample (92.2%) is male with an average age of 33 (=13.7).  
I also use the variable year to represent the year in which the individual 
engaged in extremist behavior. Year represents the date of the violent or non-violent 
extremist behavior as reported in the sources. This is a continuous variable that 
controls for the change in social media exposure over time.9 
Missing Data 
Table 1 also shows the prevalence of missing data in the variables in this 
analysis. A majority of the variables, specifically Violent, Social Media, Algorithm, 
Group Membership, Islamist and Year do not have any missing data given that 
complete information on these variables is required for inclusion into the dataset and 
my analytic sample.  However, there is a range of missing data in Intimate Social 
                                                 
9 This time point was used in coding to ensure that all data that was collected represents the 
individual’s behaviors before their engagement in the extremist behavior that led to their inclusion in 





Group, Age, Previous Criminal Activity, and Education. As shown in Table 1, 
Education and Previous Criminal Activity are missing over 30% of the cases, Intimate 
Social Group is missing less than 20% of the cases, Age is missing less than 1%.  
Methods 
 I first discuss strategies for handling missing data and then describe the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses that I use to test my hypotheses.  
Addressing Missing Data 
In this study I use multiple imputation through chain equations (MICE) to 
address the high degree of missing data in the PIRUS dataset (Graham, 2009; 
Graham, Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007). When considering strategies for missing data, 
the first step is to identify the mechanism through which the missing values relate to 
other observed and unobserved variables, and the missing variable itself. According 
to Safer-Lichtenstein et al. (2017), it is imperative that researchers understand and 
discuss any assumptions they make when creating point estimates for a set of 
multivariate coefficients, as making any of these missing data assumptions comes 
with costs and, more importantly, implications for any conclusions. 
The three mechanisms of missing values explained by Graham (2009) are 
missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not 
at random (MNAR). The second mechanism, MAR, explains the conditions where we 
can observe the ways in which those with missing data differ from those without 
missing data. In the presence of MAR, those with missing data are systematically 





(auxiliary variables) can make the MAR assumption more defensible. In these cases, 
the model should include variables that are correlated with the variables that are 
missing or that are predictive of the missingness. Given the extensive number of 
variables (162) available in PIRUS, I can use other variables related to the missing 
values to model the missing data mechanism, approach the assumptions of MAR and 
obtain a dataset without any missing values using MICE.   
 Past research using the PIRUS data has utilized multiple imputation methods 
to deal with the high amounts of missing data on some variables  (Jasko, LaFree, & 
Kruglanski, 2017). Jasko et al. (2017) employ a multiple imputation strategy (MICE) 
as a solution to missing data problems. Similarly, I use MICE as a strategy to address 
missing data. This imputation method creates multiple datasets, using all variables 
from the analysis and a set of auxiliary variables to estimate values for the missing 
variables. Multiple iterations are run until the estimates converge (Graham, 2009). 
Based on Rubin (1987), each point estimate is the average of that parameter estimate 
in each of the imputed datasets. Multiple imputation allows parameter estimates to be 
unbiased and standard errors that are able to capture sampling variation and 
estimation variation (Graham et al., 2007). In MICE, a model for each variable is fit 
conditional on all other variables in the missing data model using the proper 
distribution for each variable (i.e. count, continuous, categorical). The number of 
imputations recommended is dependent on the amount of missing data. Graham 
(2009) discusses completing at least 40 imputations in cases of 50% missing data (see 
also, Graham, Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007). Though Graham et al. (2007) identify 





makes it easier to handle a large number of iterations. Given the prevalence of 
missing data, I use MICE to estimate 100 complete datasets and then Rubin’s (1987) 
rules to create the point estimates to form a final dataset that I use for my analyses.   
Analysis 
The analysis begins with a set of bivariate correlations between my 
independent variables and the dependent variable, Violence. After completing this 
analysis, I then conduct a multivariate analysis using logistic (logit) regression. Logit 
regression is appropriate for the proposed study because Violent is a binary measure.   
  To answer the research questions identified in this study, I estimate separate 
models using Violent as the dependent variable. The first model includes Social 
Media as the primary independent variable and all control variables. The second 
model includes Algorithm as the primary independent variable and all control 
variables. I estimate two versions of these models, where I first include only a set of 
basic controls and then add augmented controls to see how the relationships change10. 
Both models are clustered to account for any serial correlation that is attributable to 
the individuals in the sample knowing each other. Additionally, I estimate robust 
standard errors due to the heteroskedasticity associated with a binary dependent 
variable.  
                                                 
10 I distinguish age, foreign fighter and year as augmented controls because they are highly correlated 





Chapter 4: Results  
In this chapter, I discuss the results beginning with the bivariate correlations 
between each explanatory variable and the dependent variable (Violent) to understand 
the associations between them. Following this discussion, I describe the findings from 
my multivariate models and then explain a set of post hoc analyses I undertake to 
further explore my findings.  
Bivariate Results 
I present the bivariate statistics in Table 2.  According to Table 2, both my 
hypotheses are supported at the bivariate level.  Those individuals with social media 
exposure are significantly more likely to engage in violent extremism compared to 
those with no exposure to social media. Additionally, those individuals with exposure 
to social media platforms using personalization algorithms are also more likely to 
engage in extremist violence compared to other political extremists. I also find that 
foreign fighters, Islamists and males are significantly more likely to engage in violent 
extremism. Also, individuals espousing a Far Right ideology are significantly less 
likely to engage in violent extremism.  The results also show that age is negatively 
correlated with violent extremism: younger persons are more likely than older 
persons to engage in violent extremism. Also, the results highlight that over time 










Table 2. Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables and Dependent 
Variable (Violent)  
Variable Correlation Coefficient 
Social Media 0.137* 
Algorithm 0.150* 
Basic Controls  
Intimate Social Group 0.089 
Group Membership -0.015 
Education -0.093 
Male 0.113* 
Previous Criminal Activity 0.015 
Far Right -0.163* 
Islamist 0.253** 
Augmented Controls  
Age -.284*  
































Table 3. H1: Logistic Regression with dependent variable (Violent)   
  Model 1a (n=347) Model 1b (n=347) 
Independent 
Variables 








Social Media 0.478* 1.612 0.256 -0.359 0.698 0.33 
Basic Controls       
Intimate 
Social Group 
0.42 1.521 0.33 0.347 1.415 0.376 
Group 
Membership 
-0.182 0.834 0.316 -0.388 0.678 0.352 
Education -0.184 0.832 0.311 -0.128 0.88 0.347 




0.222 1.248 0.149 0.296* 1.344 0.152 
Far Right 0.11 1.117 0.364 0.5 1.641 0.38 
Islamist 1.160** 3.19 0.369 0.006 1.006 0.406 
Augmented 
Controls  
      
Age - - - -0.027** 0.973 0.011 
Foreign 
Fighter 
- - - 2.639** 13.993 0.475 
Year - - - 0.106** 1.112 0.045 
       
 
*p<.05 **p<.05 Note: SE is the abbreviation for standard error. All p-values are 
reported for a one tailed test. 
 
Table 3 presents the multivariate results from the logistic regressions I 
conducted to test H1. Model 1a only includes the basic controls and model 1b is the 
fully specified model, including the augmented control variables.  
Considering the bivariate relationships highlighting that foreign fighters, 
younger individuals and year of extremist behavior are highly associated with violent 
extremism and knowing that historically these variables are also highly related to 
social media exposure, I decide to exclude them in model 1a. Extant research finds 





extremists (Weimann, 2016). Also, literature supports that in general social media 
usage is more highly correlated with younger individuals and that since its inception 
in 2005 social media has become increasingly popular. Keeping in mind that these 
variables are not only highly associated with extremist violence but also social media, 
I exclude them from Model 1a. Model 1a highlights that, without the inclusion of 
these variables, there is a positive relationship between exposure to social media and 
engagement in violent extremism. The odds of violent extremism are 61.2% higher 
for extremists with exposure to social media compared to other extremists. 
Additionally, I find that the odds of violent extremism are 3.2 times higher for 
Islamists compared to extremists espousing single issue or Far Left ideologies.  
However, in model 1b, I find that the inclusion of the augmented variables 
explains the relationship between social media exposure and violence and, though 
social media exposure is associated with violence at the bivariate level, the 
relationship is spurious. This means that the relationship between social media 
exposure and violence is driven by age, foreign fighters and year of the attack. In 
model 1b, I find that the odds of violent extremism are 14 times higher for foreign 
fighters compared to other political extremists. As age increases the odds of violent 
extremism decrease by 2.7%.  I also find that over time the odds of violent extremism 
increase by 11.2%. Additionally, I find that the inclusion of the augmented variables 
explains the relationship between Islamists and violent extremism as well. Given that 
all foreign fighters are Islamist, the correlation between these two variables explains 
this finding. In this model, I also find that more serious previous criminal activity 






Table 4. H2: Logistic Regression with dependent variable (Violent) 













Algorithm 0.604** 1.829 0.255 -0.183 0.833 0.328 
Basic 
Controls 
      
Intimate 
Social Group 
0.43 1.538 0.33 0.36 1.434 0.375 
Group 
Membership 
-0.16 0.852 0.318 -0.375 0.688 0.35 
Education -0.184 0.832 0.312 -0.128 0.88 0.346 




0.225 1.252 0.15 0.292* 1.339 0.151 
Far Right 0.111 1.117 0.368 0.458  1.581 0.377 
Islamist 1.176** 3.24 0.37 -0.014  0.986 0.404 
Augmented 
Controls 
      
Age - - - -0.026* 0.975 0.011 
Foreign 
Fighter 
- - - 2.608** 13.567 0.476 
Year - - - 0.095* 1.1 0.045 
 
 
*p<.05 **p<.01 Note: SE is the abbreviation for standard error. All p-values are 
reported for a one tailed test.  
 
Similarly, to the test of H1, in table 4 I first provide a model with only the 
basic controls (2a) and then a fully specified model, including the augmented controls 
(2b) testing the relationship between algorithm and violence.  
 In model 2a, I find that the odds of violent extremism are 82.9% higher for 
extremists with exposure to personalization algorithms compared to other extremists. 
I also find that, compared to those espousing Far Left or single issue ideologies, the 
odds of violent extremism are 3.2 times higher for Islamists. The findings in this 





variables that when included explain the relationship between personalization 
algorithms and violence. 
 Model 2b highlights how this relationship changes when controlling for age, 
foreign fighter status and year of extremist behavior. Adding these three controls to 
the model explains the relationship between personalization algorithms and violence, 
suggesting that the bivariate association between these two variables is spurious. I 
find that the odds of extremist violence are 13.6 times higher for foreign fighters 
compared to other political extremists. Additionally, as age increases the odds of 
violent extremism decrease by 2.5%. I also find that over time there is a 10% increase 
in the odds of violent extremism. The addition of these three variables also explains 
the relationship between Islamists and violent extremism. This is due to the high 
correlation between this variable and Foreign Fighter since all Foreign Fighters are 
Islamists. These findings do not suggest that algorithms do not matter when 
considering violent extremism, they suggest that any relationship between algorithms 
and violence is dependent on age, foreign fighter status and year of extremist activity. 
In this model I also find that previous criminal activity increases the odds of violent 
extremism by 130%.  
Post Hoc Analyses 
Given the multivariate results, I further examine how each of the controls 
variables is related to social media exposure and algorithms. Considering the 
significant associations between exposure to social media and personalization 
algorithms with extremist violence that are explained by foreign fighter status, age 





important. To do this, I first explore the bivariate correlations between all the control 
variables and social media and algorithms, respectively. Then, I conduct a 
multivariate analysis considering how these variables are associated with exposure to 
social media and to platforms that employ personalization algorithms.  
Bivariate correlations  
In Table 5, I provide the bivariate correlations between Social Media and the 
other independent variables. I find that extremists involved with intimate social 
groups are significantly less likely to be exposed to social media compared to other 
extremists. I also find that those extremists engaged in extremist groups are also 
significantly less likely to be exposed to social media when compared to extremists 
who do not report group membership. Islamists are also more likely to be exposed to 
social media compared to extremists with other ideological beliefs. Additionally, I 
find that the three augmented controls (year, foreign fighters and age) are all 
significantly correlated with exposure to social media. Older extremists are less likely 
to be exposed to social media, while foreign fighters are more likely to be exposed to 













Table 5. Bivariate Correlations between Social Media and other Independent 
Variables  
Variable  Correlation Coefficient  
Basic Controls  
Intimate Social Group -0.135* 
Group Membership -0.189** 
Education -0.097 
Male 0.014 
Previous Criminal Activity  -0.018 
Far Right -0.053 
Islamist 0.1275* 
Augmented Controls  
Age -0.288** 




Comparing across the years in the sample, there is an increase in the 
frequency of exposure to social media over time. Figure 1 shows the change in the 
distribution of the sample exposed to social media, highlighting the increasing role of 
social media over the 12-year period in this sample. From 2005 to 2010, there is a 
continuous increase in exposure to social media and then in 2011, there is a decrease 
in the prevalence of social media exposure in the sample. The number of individuals 
exposed to social media increases again in 2012, drops slightly in 2013 and then 
increases again in 2014. Overall, from 2005 to 2016, more individuals are exposed to 
social media over time. The increased prevalence of exposure to social media in the 
sample is representative of an increased prevalence of social media in the US 
population generally. Duggan (2015) finds that in 2005 only 7% of the US adult 
population used social media, while in 2015 65% of the adult population was active 






Figure 1. Prevalence of Social Media over time 
  
 
The bivariate correlations, presented in table 6, highlight that Algorithm is 
significantly correlated to some of the other independent variables in my multivariate 
models. Those political extremists who are part of intimate social groups are 
significantly less likely to be exposed to social media platforms that employ 
algorithms. Similarly, political extremists who are members of extremist groups are 
also significantly less likely to be exposed to social media platforms that use 
algorithms compared to extremists with no group membership. I find that the three 
augmented controls that explain the relationship between algorithm and violence 
(Model 2) are significantly correlated with exposure to personalization algorithms. 
Older extremists are also significantly less likely to be exposed to algorithms 
compared to younger extremists. Foreign fighters are significantly more likely to be 
exposed to algorithms compared to other extremists. Also, I find that over time there 


















Table 6. Bivariate Correlations between Algorithm and other Independent Variables  
Variable  Correlation Coefficient  
Basic Controls  
Intimate Social Group -0.148* 
Group Membership -0.197** 
Education -0.08 
Male 0.013 
Previous Criminal Activity  -0.014 
Far Right -0.037 
Islamist 0.089 
Augmented Controls  
Age -0.265** 





 Given the multivariate results highlighting that age, foreign fighters and years 
explain the relationship between social media and violence and algorithms and 
violence, I decided to include a set of multivariate analyses to better understand how 
these three variables are directly associated with social media and algorithms.  
Although I do find bivariate correlations between the other independent 
variables and exposure to social media, it is unclear how these other factors are 
associated with social media exposure. Model 4 below highlights the association 
between these variables and social media exposure (table 7). I find that membership 
in extremist groups decreases the odds of exposure to social media by 45.3%. Also, 
the odds of exposure to social media are 3.2 times lower for extremists with a Far 





Additionally, I find that the three variables that explain the relationship 
between social media exposure and violent extremism, are significantly associated to 
social media. Specifically, foreign fighters have 2.7 times higher odds of exposure to 
social media compared to other political extremists. Additionally, the odds of 
exposure to social media are 6.1% lower as extremists get older. It also appears that 
over time the odds of exposure to social media increase by 44.6%. Considering the 
previous results, I find that these three variables are all significantly related to violent 
extremism and now find that they are significantly related to social media exposure as 
well. These significant relationships offer insight into why their inclusion explains the 
relationship between social media and violent extremism (Table 3). It is not simply 
that social media exposure is not related to violent extremism, rather that foreign 
fighter status, age and the year of extremist behavior drive the relationship between 















Table 7. Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable (Social Media) 
 
  Model 4 (n=347) 
Independent 
Variables 
Beta Odds Ratio 
Robust 
SE 
Intimate Social Group -0.209 0.812 0.338 
Group Membership -0.604* 0.547 0.327 
Education -0.052 0.949 0.339 
Male 0.267 1.306 0.47 
Previous Criminal 
Activity 
0.03 1.031 0.151 
Far Right 1.167** 3.21 0.459 
Islamist 0.439 1.552 0.5 
Age -0.053** 0.949 0.014 
Foreign Fighter 1.007** 2.737 0.376 
Year 0.369** 1.446 0.048 
 
*p<.05 **p<.01 Note: SE is the abbreviation for standard error. All p-values are 
reported for a one tailed test.  
 
 Following this analysis, I also conduct a second analysis using personalization 
algorithms as my dependent variable. Given that the relationship between algorithms 
and violence is also explained by foreign fighters, age and the year of extremist 
behavior, I am interested in how these variables are related to my measure of whether 
individuals are using social media platforms that contain algorithms. Model 5 
provides the results of this analysis looking at the association between the 
independent variables and personalization algorithms (table 8).  
 I find that membership in extremist groups is negatively associated with 
exposure to personalization algorithms. Specifically, membership in extremist groups 
decreases the odds of exposure to personalization algorithms by 44.9%. Additionally, 
the odds of exposure to personalization algorithms is 2.9 more likely for extremists 





Similarly to their significant relationships with exposure to social media 
(Table 7), foreign fighter status, age and year of extremist behavior are all 
significantly associated with exposure to personalization algorithms. The odds of 
exposure to personalization algorithms are 3.14 times higher for foreign fighters 
compared to other political extremists. Also, as extremists get older the odds of 
exposure to personalization algorithms decrease by 6.2%. I find that over time the 
odds of exposure to personalization algorithms increase by 49.2%. Understanding 
how these variables are related to personalization algorithms, allows for insight into 
why they explain the relationship between algorithms and violence (model 2). Given 
that these variables all predict the use of algorithms and extremist violence, I can 
identify why their inclusion drives the relationship between personalization 
















Table 8. Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable (Algorithm)  









-0.247 0.781 0.344 
Group 
Membership 
-0.596* 0.551 0.328 
Education -0.047 0.954 0.339 




0.02 1.02 0.139 
Far Right 1.059* 2.883 0.476 
Islamist 0.048 1.049 0.52 
Age -0.053** 0.948 0.014 
Foreign 
Fighter 
1.145** 3.141 0.393 
Year 0.400** 1.492 0.05 
*p<.05 **p<.01 Note: SE is the abbreviation for standard error. All p-values are 
reported for a one tailed test.  
Summary of Results  
Overall, I do not find support for either of the hypotheses. However, I do find 
that both exposure to social media and personalization algorithms are positively 
associated with extremist violence, although both of these relationships are explained 
by foreign fighter status, age and the year in which the extremist behavior occurred11.  
Chapter 5:  Discussion 
Though multivariate results suggest that exposure to social media and 
personalization algorithms are not significantly related to violent extremism, 
                                                 
11 I used two additional missing data strategies (mean imputation and fixed value imputation), in 
addition to MICE, and find that the results are consistent across the three different methods used to 





additional analyses indicate that the relationship between these variables is more 
complex. Exposure to social media and personalization algorithms is positively and 
significantly correlated with violent extremism, however the inclusion of age, foreign 
fighter status, and year of extremist behavior explains this relationship. Given this 
finding, it is important to discuss why exposure to social media and personalization 
algorithms may not be related to violent extremism, but at the same time determine 
why the relationship is influenced by age, foreign fighter status and time controls. In 
the following section, I begin with an explanation of the theoretical considerations of 
why exposure to social media and personalization algorithms may not increase the 
likelihood of violent extremism, then transition into a discussion of how this may be 
different across age, foreign fighter status and time. I then discuss the limitations of 
this study, followed by a brief summary, and conclude with an explanation of future 
directions.  
Theoretical Considerations 
When presenting my hypotheses, I posit that learning can occur in online 
environments and that exposure to extremist content on social media leads to an 
increased likelihood of engagement in violent extremism. I also argue that social 
media platforms allow for exposure to content that can reinforce an individual’s ideas 
due to the use of personalization algorithms. Both of these hypotheses are in contrast 
to Sutherland’s (1947; Cressey, 1965) classic statement that learning only occurs in 
face-to-face environments and more supportive of Akers’ (2009) explanation of the 
influence of media on learning. Though this study uses social learning theory (SLT) 





extremism, it is not a perfect test of the theory.  First, I was unable to do a direct test 
of the four elements of SLT (imitation, definitions, differential association, 
differential reinforcement), and second, SLT is a theory that contrasts criminal and 
non-criminal behavior. My data only allow me to distinguish between violent and 
non-violent behavior.  Nevertheless, it is possible that learning does not occur over 
social media in a way that leads to behavioral changes offline.  
 Kenney (2010) argues that in recent years, researchers have focused too much 
on the internet as providing websites, chat rooms and other platforms for 
communication among terrorists. He challenges this understanding by arguing that 
the internet provides “abstract technical knowledge” and religious and ideological 
information but is unable to provide the “experiential situational knowledge” 
necessary for political violence (pg. 180). When specifically looking at the behaviors 
of Islamist militants in Spain and Britain, Kenney suggests that terrorists may be able 
to learn how to build a bomb, shoot a weapon, or how to engage in other types of 
violence from the internet but without practice they will not gain hands-on expertise. 
In order for an individual to fully become a successful terrorist they need these 
practical skills. While knowledge and practice are both important, the latter allows 
individuals to be able to use the knowledge in their specific circumstance. The 
internet cannot provide these practical skills and, according to Kenney (2010:181), 
they must be “shared among practitioners through face-to-face interactions, 
storytelling, apprenticeships, and hands-on demonstrations in building bombs, firing 
weapons, and other activities.” Considering this explanation, social media may not be 





lacks the face to face interactions that both Kenney and Sutherland explain as being 
important when it comes to learning.  
Additionally, when considering SLT, the theoretical framework explains 
differential association as learning definitions favorable to engagement in criminal 
behavior as compared to definitions that view criminal behavior as unfavorable. 
However, in this study the dependent variable does not measure this dichotomy, but 
rather measures the difference between violent and non-violent illegal behavior. It is 
entirely possible that exposure to extremist content over social media may not be 
differentially related to violent and non-violent outcomes, but rather is related to 
engaging in extremist behavior irrespective of the severity of that behavior. Pauwels 
and Schils (2016) find that SLT is related to engaging in ideologically motivated 
crimes against both property and persons, lending support to the notion that social 
media exposure does not differentially impact violent and non-violent crimes. If this 
holds true, then the null findings in this study make sense, as social media should not 
be related to an increased likelihood of violent compared to non-violent extremism 
rather related to extremist behavior regardless of severity.    
Though the findings suggest that Sutherland may be right and face-to-face 
interactions may be more important than interactions over media for learning, we 
cannot ignore Akers’ (2009) argument that individuals may learn from the media 
through imitation and reinforcement. The findings do not suggest that social media is 
not important in the development of extremist violence, rather that there are other 
characteristics of individuals that are more important in explaining violent extremism. 





not because the internet cannot provide hands on experiences, rather because other 
characteristics are more important when considering violent extremism. In the 
multivariate models, I find that the associations between social media and violence 
and algorithms and violence are explained by age, foreign fighter and time, 
suggesting that these variables may be more important than social media and 
algorithms when it comes to explaining violent vs. non-violent extremism.  
When exploring this further, I find that not only are these three variables 
significantly associated with violent extremism, they are also significantly associated 
with exposure to social media and to algorithms. In the post hoc analyses, I find that 
foreign fighters are significantly more likely to be exposed to social media and to 
personalization algorithms. This finding aligns with extant literature where Hoffman 
(2017) explains how social media is relevant for foreign fighters because their points 
of contact with foreign groups mainly come from social media (see also, Weimann, 
2016). Social media is the main way of communicating with other extremists and 
learning about a movement for foreign fighters because by definition they are 
geographically removed from the group (Hoffman, 2017; Weimann, 2012, 2016). 
Foreign fighters are a distinct group of extremists, suggesting that since these groups 
rely so much on social media to communicate we may assume that social media is 
relevant on a wider scale, when in reality it matters disproportionately for a specific 
subset of the population.  
Additionally, traditional criminological theory has identified age as a main 
correlate of crime, explaining that younger individuals are more likely to engage in 





relationship between age and crime (DeLisi and Vaughn, 2016). My findings suggest 
that age is more important when explaining violent extremism, in part because 
exposure to social media and personalization algorithms follow the same pattern, 
where younger individuals are more likely than older individuals to be exposed to 
these platforms. Given that younger people have (typically) adapted to this new 
technology faster than older people, this relationship is also relevant over time. From 
2005 to 2016, social media exposure in the sample increased dramatically, from a 
minority of the sample exposed in 2005 to the majority exposed in 2016. This change 
highlights that though social media is seen as a new technology and there is a concern 
surrounding its impact on extremism, this effect may not be present as society adapts 
to social media and it becomes more ubiquitous over time. In summary, it is 
important to consider that the effect of social media is time variant, that the impact of 
social media has changed since 2005 and that it will continue to change into the 
future.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations to this thesis that warrant further discussion. 
First, there are some limitations that are unavoidable with the PIRUS dataset. The 
open source methodology of data collection has some important limitations related to 
the representativeness of the sample. The individuals included in PIRUS all must 
have engaged in some type of ideological behavior that is extreme enough for them to 
be included in the sources. Their behavior must have brought them to the attention of 
either the news media or the criminal justice system. Given the sampling procedures 





outside the sample included in PIRUS. Also, given the cross-sectional nature of the 
data collection, coding is completed retrospectively, and thus it is hard to establish 
temporal ordering between the different antecedent variables coded before the 
dependent variable, Violent.   
 The data collection process also systematically excludes those individuals 
who hold strong ideological beliefs but fail to engage in any behavior in support of 
their beliefs. By excluding these individuals, the dataset cannot differentiate between 
individuals with extremist attitudes who have committed crime and those who have 
not. Without the presence of this group, it is inappropriate to use any findings to 
distinguish between decisions to engage in ideologically motivated behavior, rather 
we can only understand the differences between engaging in types of ideologically 
motivated behavior (violent vs. non-violent).  
Additionally, researchers who collect PIRUS data use a multitude of different 
publicly available sources including news reports and court records to collect and 
code data. Due to the reliance on open sources for data, the reporting behaviors of the 
different news sources and court records moderates the presence of data in all the 
variables. It is entirely possible that more information will be present on those 
individuals who have engaged in some behavior that is of interest to the news and 
media sources and these will be the individuals who have more complete information. 
The news tends to pay more attention to more extreme cases and thus the cases that 
ended in violent behavior may have more data available than those with non-violent 
outcomes (Jensen et al., 2016). This process creates some concerns with missing data 





attention to individuals who follow an Islamist ideology as compared to those of other 
ideologies (Boyle et al., 2017). These reporting behaviors may increase the 
probability that those of an Islamist ideology will be overrepresented in the data.  
Additional information related to social media usage would also have been 
useful to understand more completely the role of social media in the development of 
extremist behavior. For example, information about the frequency of social media 
usage and the types of behaviors engaged in over social media (i.e. viewing content 
vs. sharing content).  With these measures it would be possible to identify those 
individuals who actively seek out extremist content compared to passively view 
content on social media. We could also then differentiate between those individuals 
for whom social media was the primary form of exposure to extremist content 
compared to those for whom it played an auxiliary role.  
Additionally, while I posit that individuals will be influenced by echo 
chambers due to the structure of social media, I am unable to measure the extent to 
which the platforms actually served as echo chambers. It is entirely possible that the 
individuals in this sample, though exposed to social media and personalization 
algorithms, were not involved in echo chambers related to extremist content. I am 
assuming that due to algorithms everyone using social media is in an echo chamber, 
however I do not know if this is actually the case. Though I aim to address this 
assumption with Algorithm by differentiating between platforms that do and do not 
use personalization, there are some limitations related to the construction of this 
measure. When identifying the platforms that use algorithms compared to those that 





algorithms to avoid a circumstance where an individual was using a platform before 
an algorithm was created and measuring them as using an algorithm. Though I made 
efforts to corroborate reports about the onset of algorithm usage on each platform 
there was still some discrepancy across sources. I used the earliest date that had the 
most support, but it is possible that by using publicly available information this 
measure may not be completely accurate.  
Summary and Future Directions 
In this thesis, I aim to understand the relationship between exposure to social 
media and engagement in violent extremism. As social media develops and becomes 
more integrated into everyday life, a better understanding of the influence of social 
media on radicalization and engagement in violent extremism becomes increasingly 
important. The population targeted by this research is hard to study due to the 
constraints of reaching these individuals, so open source methods may be the best 
method available to study those who have engaged in ideologically motivated 
behavior. Though this thesis has limitations and does not find direct support for the 
main hypotheses, there are still some significant findings that lay the ground work for 
future research. I find that social media and algorithms are both significantly 
correlated with violent extremism, however these relationships are explained by age, 
foreign fighters and the year of extremist behavior. This is an important finding in 
itself as social media and content online may matter differentially for these groups as 
time goes on. We cannot rule out Akers’ (2009) explanation of media as an important 





Sutherland does, rather we need to further explore how social media may be 
important across different contexts and groups within society.  
Given the findings from this study, there are a few different elements that 
should be explored in further research. It is important for researchers to consider how 
social media is important in the development of extremist behavior for younger 
individuals and foreign fighters, especially over time as social media becomes 
increasingly widespread. These groups are more likely to be exposed to social media 
and to engage in violent extremism, warranting further exploration into their use of 
social media as it relates to their behavior.  If possible, researchers should try to 
monitor publicly available social media accounts of known political extremists to 
understand more about the frequency of their usage and their behaviors on these 
accounts. This will allow for a nuanced exploration of social media as it relates to 
extremism.  
Additionally, research should also aim to understand whether social media 
exposure is related to more successful plots. It may be the case that social media 
exposure does not increase the likelihood of engaging in violence but increases the 
probability that the plot will be successful. Finally, if appropriate data can be 
collected on social media usage, researchers would be able to test the elements of 
SLT in social media and understand more appropriately whether learning can actually 
occur in online environments. Before we completely rule out any role social media 
may have in violent extremism, it is important that future research expand on this 





different data, samples and methodologies to gain more insight into the nuanced role 
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